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Abstract.  Safety-critical systems composed of highly similar, semi-autonomous agents are being developed in 
several application domains.  An example of such multi-agent systems is a fleet, or “constellation” of satellites.  In 
constellations of satellites, each satellite is commonly treated as a distinct autonomous agent that must cooperate to 
achieve higher-level constellation goals.  In previous work, we have shown that modeling a constellation of satellites 
or  spacecraft  as  a  product  line  of  agents  (where  the  agents  have  many  shared  commonalities  and  a  few  key 
differences) enables reuse of software analysis and design assets.  We have also previously developed efficient 
safety analysis techniques for product lines. 
 
We here propose the use of Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) to aid in system certification.  We extend BDSA 
to  product  lines  of  multi-agent  systems  and  show  how  the  analysis  artifacts  thus  produced  contribute  to  the 
software’s safety case for certification purposes.  The product-line approach lets us reuse portions of the safety 
analysis for multiple agents, significantly reducing the burden of certification.  We motivate and illustrate this work 
through a specific application, a product-line, multi-agent satellite constellation.      
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1.  Introduction 
The emergence of distributed systems (e.g., formation flying of satellite constellations) as a viable and 
reliable  architecture  for  mission-critical  domains  coupled  with  the  advantages  of  adopting  an  agent-
oriented perspective for software development has led to a number of proposed systems combining these 
two  concepts.    A  multi-agent  system  (MAS)  is  an  application  “designed  and  developed  in  terms  of 
autonomous software entities that can flexibly achieve their objectives by interacting with one another in 
terms of high-level protocols and languages” [24].  Actual proposed systems including the Terrestrial 
Planet Finder-I (TPF-I) spacecraft [22] and the TechSat-21 [3], Sun-Solar System Connection, Search for 
Earthlike Planets and Universe Exploration all rely on constellation missions to achieve their scientific 
goals  [18].    Agent-oriented  software  engineering  (AOSE)  appears  be  an  appropriate  software 
development methodology for such systems [21].   
 
Certification is a process whereby a certification authority determines if an applicant provides sufficient 
evidence  concerning  the  means  of  production  of  a  candidate  product  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
candidate  product  so  that  the  requirements  of  the  certifying  authority  are  fulfilled  [11,  13,  19,  20].  
Software safety analysis techniques, similar to those used in this work, have previously been shown to 
contribute to the certification of software-intensive systems in [1, 16].  However, little work has been 
specifically aimed at software product lines or MAS.  A software product line is defined as a set of 
software-intensive systems sharing a common, managed set of features that satisfy the specific needs of a 
particular market segment or mission [23].  The work presented here tailors the safety analysis techniques 
to a particular AOSE methodology, Gaia, to support certification of product-line, agent-based systems.   2 
The main contribution of this paper is to extend Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) to product line 
MAS and show how the analysis artifacts thus produced contribute to the software’s safety case for 
certification purposes.  The product-line approach lets us reuse portions of the safety analysis assets for 
multiple, similar agents, significantly reducing the burden of certification.   
 
First, we further the inclusion of safety analysis techniques into AOSE by providing a structured process 
to perform a Software Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (SFMECA) for safety-critical, product-
line MAS.  The SFMECA is reusable for other agents in the system since our approach incorporates the 
product-line vision of a MAS from [6].   
 
Second, safety analysis techniques contribute to system certification of product-line MAS by verifying 
software design compliance with reliability, robustness and safety standards.  Because the safety analysis 
is performed on the product line as a whole (rather than serially on each individual product-line member), 
the safety analysis assessment techniques described in this work may significantly reduce the time and 
cost of certifying a safety-critical MAS.         
 
This paper illustrates the process and contributions of this work using an agent-based implementation of a 
satellite constellation loosely based on the requirements for the TechSat21 [3, 21].  TechSat21 was a 
proposed mission, originally scheduled to launch in January 2006 but cancelled in late 2003 with much of 
the software reused on a subsequent mission [4].  It was designed to explore the benefits of a distributed, 
cooperative approach to satellites employing agents [3].      
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews background and related work in 
software safety analysis techniques and product-line MAS.  Section 3 details our approach in utilizing the 
BDSA  technique  for  safety-critical,  product-line  MAS  to  assist  in  certifying  the  composite  system.  
Finally, Section 4 provides concluding remarks and future research directions. 
 
2.  Background and Related Work 
The  research  presented  here  integrates  existing  work  in  software  safety  analysis  with  software 
engineering for multi-agent systems (MAS) to aid in system certification.  Certification may apply to the 
development process, the developer or the actual product [16].  Since it is insufficient to certify the 
process or developer for the software of safety-critical systems, building a safety case that provides “an 
argument accompanied by evidence that all safety concerns and risks have been correctly identified and 
mitigated” [10] aids in the certification of the product.  Further, this work builds upon our previous work 
of integrating the reuse potential of safety analysis assets into the design and development of product-line 
MAS.   
 
2.1 Software Safety Techniques  
Software safety analysis centers on the investigation of how software can jeopardize or contribute to the 
safety of the system [15].  Two common techniques used in software safety analysis are Software Failure 
Modes,  Effects  and  Criticality  Analysis  (SFMECA)  and  Software  Fault Tree  Analysis  (SFTA).    Bi-
Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) combines these two techniques in order to provide both a forward 
analysis to determine systems effects of software failure modes to effects on the systems and to determine 
if those failure modes are possible in the system to be certified [16].   
 
SFMECA is a tabular, forward (inductive) search technique that starts with the failure of a component or 
subsystem and then looks at its effect on the overall system [15].  In [17], a list of generic failure-mode 
guidewords is given to aid in the process of constructing a SFMECA for failure in data communication   3 
and event processing.  These guidewords, when applied to the failure of a component or subsystem, help 
engineers  systematize  the  process  of  determining  the  possible  effects  of  each  failure  mode  on  other 
components of the system that could lead to a hazard(s).   
 
SFTA is a tree-based, backward (deductive) technique that typically has as its root node a system-wide, 
catastrophic event [15].  Analysis proceeds by determining the set of necessary preconditions causing the 
occurrence of the hazard.  The set of possible causes are connected to the parent node by logic gates to 
describe their contributing relation.  This process continues through each level of the constructed subtree 
until basic events are reached or until the desired level of subsystem detail is achieved. 
 
A technique to cleanly extend SFTA to software product lines was introduced in [8].  A SFTA can be 
constructed for an entire product line and product-line members’ fault trees can be derived from the 
product-line  SFTA.    PLFaultCAT,  a  graphical  tool  to  construct  a  product-line  SFTA,  exploits  this 
technique and then allows users to automatically derive a product-line members’ fault tree given the 
variabilities to be included [8].     
   
BDSA combines a search from potential failure modes to their effects with a search from possible hazards 
to the contributing causes of each hazard [17].  Although BDSA does not require SFMECA and SFTA to 
be  used  as  the  forward  and  backward  search,  respectively,  we  follow  [12]  and  [16]  in  using  these 
techniques in our BDSA. 
 
2.2 Product-Line, Multi-Agent Systems  
Reuse  of  software-engineering  assets  continues  to  be  a  demand  on  software  system  development 
methodologies.  Software product-line engineering models provide software engineers a reuse-conscious 
development platform that can contribute to significantly reducing both the time and cost of software 
requirements specification, development, maintenance and evolution [5].  In a product line, the common, 
managed set of features shared by all members is the commonalities.  The members of a product line may 
differ from each other via a set of allowed features not necessarily found in other members of the product 
line (i.e., the variabilities).      
 
Agent-oriented software engineering (AOSE) has provided tools and techniques allowing for natural, 
high-level  abstractions  in  which  software  developers  can  understand,  model  and  develop  complex 
systems [24].  Several AOSE methodologies have been proposed for various types of application domains 
including Tropos [2] and MaSE [9].  We selected Gaia [24] as the AOSE design methodology with which 
to  incorporate  safety  analysis  because  of  its  extensive  documentation  and  acceptance  in  the  AOSE 
community.     
 
The Gaia methodology centers on defining an agent based upon the role(s) that it can assume.  Each role’s 
requirements specification is defined by its protocols (i.e., defines how agents interact), activities (i.e., the 
computations  associated  with  the  role  that  can  be  executed  without  interacting  with  other  agents), 
permissions  (i.e.,  the  information  resources  that  the  role  can  read,  change  and  generate)  and 
responsibilities (i.e., the liveness and safety properties the role must ensure).  
 
Using the Gaia methodology, Dehlinger and Lutz applied the notion of an agent having different possible 
levels of intelligence for a given role to investigate the reuse advantages of product-line engineering in 
developing  multi-agent  systems  (MAS)  [6].    For  example,  a  role  in  a  distributed  system  of  nodes, 
depending on its environment and context, may have one of the following levels of intelligence: 
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·  I4: receive/execute commands 
·  I3: local planning and receive/execute commands 
·  I2: local planning, interaction, partial system-knowledge and receive/execute commands 
·  I1: system-level planning, interaction, full systems-knowledge and receive/execute commands 
 
The level of intelligence for a role may dynamically change during run-time depending on the system’s 
organization and/or goals.  For example, at any given time only a single agent in a distributed system may 
have role X operating at intelligence level I1.  However, several other agents with role X may operate at 
intelligence level I3 but be capable of dynamically increasing the role’s intelligence level to I1 if needed 
(i.e., a hot-spare/warm-spare concept).  Similarly, some agents with role X may be restricted to operating 
only in I4 or I3 due to resource constraints or design decisions.  Adopting this view, a MAS can be 
designed using the notions of product-line engineering to fully take advantage of the reuse principles 
inherent in product lines.   
   
In [7], it was shown how safety analysis can ensure the safety and reliability of product-line MAS using 
SFTA.  This work extends [7] to include a SFMECA safety analysis enabling BDSA for product-line 
MAS.  
 
 
Figure 1. An overview of our process situated in the Gaia-based product-line approach in developing MAS. 
 
3.  Applying Bi-Directional Safety Analysis to Multi-Agent Systems  
The use of Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA), detailed in Section 3.3, requires the use of forward 
and backward searches.  In this work, we use Software Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(SFMECA), discussed in Section 3.1, and Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA), discussed in Section 3.2, 
as the forward and backward search technique, respectively.   
 
Using the Gaia methodology [24], we situate the safety analysis step, shown in Figure 1, as using the 
software  engineering  assets  (i.e.,  the  Role  Schema)  of  the  “Analysis  and  Design”  phase  but  also 
augmenting  the  requirements  specifications  of  the  “Analysis  and  Design”  phase.    Thus,  the  safety 
analysis, in addition to generating safety analysis assets (e.g., SFMECA tables, software fault trees, etc.) 
used to  make  a  safety  case  for the  software  during system  certification, aids in  verifying  the safety 
requirements and discovering safety requirements missed in the initial requirements specification.  Again,   5 
because the multi-agent system (MAS) is viewed as a product line, the safety analysis is providing safety 
case assets for any product line member.      
 
In the Analysis and Design phase of the Gaia methodology [24], the software engineer specifies the 
requirements in a Role Schema, shown in Figure 2, when constructing a product-line MAS.  Safety 
requirements  for a  role  are  listed in  the  form  of  safety  properties  that  the  agent  must ensure  in  the 
Responsibilities  section.    However,  Gaia  provides  no  structured  way  by  which  to  discover  safety 
requirements.  Similarly, Gaia provides no process by which to check that the safety requirements suffice 
to mitigate possible hazards.  In the following sections, we detail how performing BDSA can help verify 
and complete the safety properties that a role must guarantee.   
 
 
  Role Schema: Cluster Allocation Planner                               Schema ID: F32-I1 
     Description: 
           Assigns a new cluster configuration by assigning new satellite positions 
  within the cluster. This is done to equalize fuel use across the cluster.  With 
  the I1 intelligence level, it is able to send cluster assignments to other
  satellites (i.e., spacecraft level agents) in order to arrange a new cluster        
                configuration. This may occur when a new satellite is added or in the case  
                of a failure of a satellite.         
     Protocols and Activities:  
           CalculateDeltaV, UpdateClusterInformation, MoveNewPos, DeOrbit,  
  AssignCluster, AcceptDeltaVBids, RequestDeltaVBids,  
  SendMoveNewPosMsg, SendDeOrbitMsg    
     Permissions:  
           Reads - 
                position                              // current satellite position  
                velocityIncrement                // current satellite velocity increment  
                 supplied satelliteID              // satellite identification number  
                 supplied velocityIncrment     // satellite velocity increment  
          Changes -  
               position                                   // current satellite position 
                 velocityIncrement                   // current satellite velocity increment  
          Generates -  
               newPositionList                      // new position list to assign to the  
    // satellites within the cluster 
     Responsibilities:  
          Liveness -  
               Optimize the fuel use across the cluster.  
          Safety -  
               Prevent satellite collisions during a new cluster configuration.  
  
Figure 2. An example of the requirements specification for a role of the TechSAT21 satellite constellation specified 
as a product line in Gaia’s Role Schema. 
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Role  Event  Event 
Failure Mode  Local Effect  System Effect  Criticality 
Halt/Abnormal 
Termination 
The position¸ velocityIncrement 
and newPositionList data may 
be temporarily incorrect since 
the satellite did not complete 
moving to its new position.  
This could potentially effect 
other events such as 
UpdateClusterInformation and 
CalculateDeltaV.  
The satellite will not 
have moved to the 
position expected by 
other satellites in the 
cluster potentially 
causing a collision.   
 Major 
Omission  The satellite fails to move to its 
new assigned position in the 
cluster possible causing the 
position¸ velocityIncrement and 
newPositionList data to be 
temporarily incorrect.  This 
could potentially affect other 
events such as 
UpdateClusterInformation and 
CalculateDeltaV.   
The satellite will 
have move but, rather 
maintain its previous 
position.   Other 
satellites in the 
cluster may expect 
the satellite to have 
moved to a new 
position.  This could 
cause a collision 
because of the 
discrepancies 
between actual and 
satellite position. 
 Major 
Cluster 
Allocation 
Planner 
MoveNewPos 
Timing/Order  The satellite fails to move to 
the new position until some 
later, undetermined time 
possibly causing its position¸ 
velocityIncrement and 
newPositionList data to may be 
temporarily incorrect. This 
could potentially effect other 
events such as 
UpdateClusterInformation and 
CalculateDeltaV.  
The satellite fails to 
move to its new 
position at the time 
expected by other 
satellites in the 
cluster.  This could  
cause a collision.    
Critical 
 
Figure 3. An excerpt of the SFMECA of the MoveNewPos activity of the Cluster Allocation Planner role in the 
TechSAT21 satellite constellation. 
 
3.1 Forward Search Safety Analysis  
The forward analysis uses a Software Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA).  Gaia’s 
Role Schema conveniently partitions a role’s requirements specifications into events (functionality) that 
the role can perform and data that the role can access.  Like [12], we partition the SFMECA into separate 
analyses on the data and events.  We use guidewords of [16] to steer our investigation into the possible 
failures within a product-line multi-agent system (MAS).  We here describe first the construction of the 
SFMECA event table for the Gaia Role Schema and then the construction of the SFMECA data table.     
 
Each activity of a role (the non-underlined keywords listed in Gaia’s Role Schema under the Protocols 
and Activities section) is essentially an event (i.e., some functionality) that the role can execute.  To 
construct a SFMECA table for the events that a role can execute, as in a standard SFMECA we use the 
following  keywords  to  guide  our  analysis:  “halt/abnormal  termination”,  “omission”,  “incorrect 
logic/event” and “timing/order”.  Because the role definition depends on its variation point in the Role 
Schema, detailed in full in [6], the derived SFMECA captures the possible event and data failures for all 
the near-identical satellites.  Figure 3 gives an example of a partial SFMECA entry for the MoveNewPos 
activity for our TechSAT21 example, an event in which the satellite alters its position in the constellation.       7 
The  procedure  to  construct  a  SFMECA  table  for  the  events  from  the  Role  Schema  using  the  event 
guidewords consists of the following steps: 
 
For each role: 
For each activity listed in the Protocols and Activities section of the Role Schema:  
a. Provide the event name in the appropriate column.   
b. Apply each of the keywords to the event.  For each keyword: 
i.  Provide the event failure mode (i.e., the keyword used to discover possible failures).  
ii.  Describe the possible local effect(s) if the keyword failure happened to the event under 
consideration.    The  local  event  will  likely  only  affect  this  role  or  this  agent  and  its 
description should not include the propagation of its failure to other agents or components 
of the global system.   
iii.  Describe the possible system-level effect(s) if the keyword failure mode occurred.  This 
column  captures  the  possible  emergent  hazardous  behavior  from  the  interaction  of  the 
agents (e.g., that a collision could occur between satellites if a satellite does not change its 
position when other satellites are expecting it to).    
iv.  Give the criticality (e.g., critical, major, average, etc.) of this failure as determined by the 
global effect of this failure on the system as a whole.   
c. Apply any additional failure modes not captured by the provided keywords relevant to the 
current event and fill in the SFMECA row as appropriate.    
 
Constructing the SFMECA data table using Gaia’s Role Schema, the Permissions section lists each datum 
that the role can access, alter or generate.  To construct a SFMECA table for the data that a role uses, we 
use the following keywords to guide our analysis: “incorrect value”, “absent value”, “wrong timing” and 
“duplicated value”.  The procedure to construct a SFMECA table for the data from the Permissions 
section of the Role Schema is similar to that for the events’ table and is not shown here. 
 
3.2 Backward Search Safety Analysis  
The  backward  analysis  search  technique  used  in  this  work  utilizes  a  Software  Fault  Tree  Analysis 
(SFTA).  The SFTA can be performed in parallel and independently of the forward analysis technique(s).  
SFTA  starts  with  a  system  hazard  and  traces  backwards  to  find  the  contributing  causes  of  the 
hypothesized root hazard.  Typically, the hypothesized hazard comes from existing hazards lists or known 
domain hazards.  If, however, the SFTA is performed following the forward analysis technique(s), each 
unique Possible Hazard listed in the Software Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA) 
can be used as a SFTA starting hazard.  For example, it is clear from the SFMECA for the TechSAT21 
that a fault tree in the SFTA should include the hazard “satellite collision” as a root node.  This is a 
concept of the Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) that will be discussed further in Section 3.3.   
 
3.3 Bi-Directional Safety Analysis Results  
Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) is used to verify the completeness of the forward and backward 
search techniques.  The forward and backward techniques can be viewed as complementary since the 
output of the forward technique (i.e., the potential system-wide hazards) should match-up with the inputs 
of the backward technique.  Similarly, the output of the backward technique (i.e., the low-level, local 
errors that cause a system-wide hazard) should match-up with the inputs of the forward technique.  For 
example, we can verify the completeness of the SFTA by ensuring that every unique hazard listed in the 
Possible Hazard column of the SFMECA table with a particular level of criticality or higher (e.g., major 
criticality) is a root node within one of the fault trees of the SFTA.            
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In our TechSAT21 example, BDSA was applied to ensure that all possible hazards labeled with a “major” 
or “critical” criticality level for the MoveNewPos event were captured as the root node of a fault tree.  It 
was found that each “major” and “critical” level potential hazard in the SFMECA related to a collision of 
satellites  and  that the  SFTA  had  already  accounted  for  this  hazard.    However,  comparing  the  event 
failures in the SFMECA that could possibly lead to a satellite collision with the leaf nodes of the fault 
trees where “satellite collision” is the root node led to the discovery that the SFTA failed to account for 
the  possibility  that  a  “timing/order”  failure  in  the  execution  of  the  MoveNewPos  event  could  be  a 
contributing factor to a satellite collision.  This omission in the SFTA is likely due to SFTA’s weakness in 
representing temporal/order-specific failures [15].  Thus, the BDSA not only helped in verifying that the 
results of the forward technique were the inputs for the backward technique and vice versa, but it also 
helped identify missing failure scenarios.   
 
3.4 Applying the Safety Analysis Results to Assure Safety  
Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) helped ensure that the safety analyses used for the forward and 
backward  search  techniques  were  consistent.    In  our  case,  the  Software  Failure  Modes,  Effects  and 
Criticality Analysis (SFMECA) and the Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) were utilized to discover 
further safety requirements not already specified in the Role Schema for a given role.   
 
To assess and derive safety requirements of the Role Schema using the SFMECA, the following steps 
suffice:  
 
For each Role Schema:   
a. For each data/event listed in the Data/Event column of the SFMECA for the role represented 
in the Role Schema: 
i.  Decide  at  which  level  of  criticality  (i.e.,  critical,  major,  etc.)  the  role  must  provide 
mitigating requirements to ensure safety.  This may correspond to what level of system 
certification is required of the system.    
ii.  For each listed data/event failure mode listed in the Failure Mode column of the SFMECA 
with a criticality of at least the minimum criticality level needed for analysis (from Step i): 
1.  Consult the local effect of the failure mode in the Local Effect column of the SFMECA.  
Assure that the software mitigates the local effect.  For data, the mitigating requirement 
could be some sanity check (i.e., checking some other piece of data or monitoring that 
the data is reasonable given the software’s current state).  For events, the mitigation 
requirement could be some guard to ensure that the event is occurring under the right 
conditions and at the appropriate time given the software’s current condition.   
2.  Check  to  make  sure  that  the  product-line  MAS  software  will  prevent  the  hazard 
described in the Possible Hazard column of the SFMECA from occurring in the SFTA.  
That is, check that the hazard is mitigated in both the SFMECA and SFTA.   
3.  If the mitigation does not suffice to prevent the local effect, the software may not be 
compliant with system safety requirements.   
 
Applying this process on the TechSAT21 example using the partial SFMECA table, shown in Figure 3, 
identified several new mitigation requirements to prevent the hazard of a “satellite collision” that were 
then  added  to  the  Role  Schema.    For  the  “halt/abnormal  termination”  failure  mode,  the  mitigation 
requirement was that the MoveNewPos activity be atomic (either it executes completely or not at all).  
Alternatively, a new NotifyFinishMoveNewPos protocol could be introduced to have the satellite notify all 
satellites (or the master satellite) of the completion (or non-completion) of the MoveNewPos activity.  
Additionally, a mitigation requirement for the “timing/order” failure mode could be to assign a timestamp   9 
deadline by which each MoveNewPos activity must complete before.  Without the BDSA and SFMECA 
process detailed above, safety requirements such as these could be overlooked.                                           
 
The use of BDSA thus assists in certification of product-line MAS in two ways: 
 
·  Demonstration of compliance.  The use of BDSA provides assurances that certain classes of 
failure modes that might occur in the individual agents will not produce unacceptable effects in 
the  composite  system  (e.g.,  the  constellation,  or  fleet).    The  artifacts  produced  in  this 
investigation (SFMECA tables, SFTAs, and the Role Schemas responsibility statements) help 
demonstrate compliance of the failure-monitoring and failure-mitigation software tasked with the 
system safety requirements. 
·  Enabling reuse of certification arguments.  The use of product BDSA can reduce the burden of 
certification for systems composed of identical or near-identical units.  In systems where each 
agent is a member of a product line, the similarities can be leveraged for efficient reuse of the 
safety analysis artifacts.  At the same time, the use of Role Schemas captures any variations 
among the roles that the agents may assume.  The Role Schemas thus help ensure that the reuse of 
the artifacts in the certification arguments accurately reflects any differences among the agents.   
 
4.  Concluding Remarks  
This paper described an extension of Bi-Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) to aid in the certification of 
safety-critical,  product-line,  multi-agent  systems  (MAS).    This  extension  demonstrated  a  systematic 
process to derive a Software Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis from a product-line MAS 
analysis and design methodology.  The safety analysis assets derived using this approach are reusable 
assets since they capture the behavior of the near-identical, product line members of the MAS.  Using this 
approach, we showed how missing safety requirements can be derived from the safety analysis assets and 
how BDSA can assist in verifying the adequacy of the existing safety requirements and design.  The 
resulting product-line safety assets and verification aid in efficiently assembling a safety case during 
system certification.  Planned future work includes further investigation and evaluation of this approach 
on a large, product-line MAS under development.    
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